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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
AND APPELLATE AUTHORITY
This is an appeal from a criminal conviction after a
jury trial in the Third Circuit Court (nee Fifth Circuit
Court) for Salt Lake City, the Honorable Floyd H. Gowans,
Judge, presiding on the charges under the Revised Ordinances
of Salt Lake City of Battery, in violation of Section 32-13, R.O.S.L.C., and Destruction of Property, Section 32-3-4,
R.O.S.L.C.

Authority for this appeal is provided in Section

78-2-3, Utah Code Annotated.
ISSUES PRESENTED
I.

Whether defendant Nelson's requested instruction is

a correct statement of relevant applicable law.
II.

Whether defendant Nelson properly preserved his

right to appeal on the question of the Court's refusal to
give the requested instruction.
III.

Whether the Court committed reversible error in

refusing to give defendant Nelson's requested instruction in
the absence of any evidence supporting the instruction.

GOVERNING LAW
Utah Code of Criminal Procedure Section 77-35-19, Utah
Code Annotated
77-35-19-

Rule 19 - Instructions.

(a) At the close of the evidence or at such
earlier time as the court reasonably directs,
any party may file written request that the
court instruct the jury on the law as set
forth in the request. At the same time
copies of such requests shall be furnished to
the other parties. The court shall inform
counsel of its proposed action upon the
request; and it shall furnish counsel with a
copy of its proposed instructions, unless the
parties stipulate that such instructions may
be given orally, or otherwise waive this
requirement.
(b) Upon each written request so presented
and given, or refused, the court shall
endorse its decision and shall initial or
sign it. If part be given and part refused,
the court shall distinguish, showing by the
endorsement what part of the charge was given
and what part was refused.
(c) No party may assign as error any portion
of the charge or omission therefrom unless he
objects thereto before the jury is
instructed, stating distinctly the matter to
which he objected and the ground of his
objection. Notwithstanding a party's failure
to object, error may be assigned to
instructions in order to avoid a manifest
injustice.
(d) The court shall not comment
evidence in the case, and if the
to any of the evidence, it shall
jury that they are the exclusive
all questions of fact.

on the
court refers
instruct the
judges of

(e) Arguments of the respective parties
shall be made after the court has instructed
the jury. Unless otherwise provided by law,
any limitation upon time for argument shall
be within the discretion of the court.

(Emphasis added.)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The City agrees with the appellant's "Statement of the
Facts11 insofar as the statement accurately recites the
testimony adduced from the witnesses at trial.

Unlike the

usual case where the losing party's self-serving testimony
would be irrelevant on an appeal, consideration of defendant
Nelson's testimony is, in this case, relevant to the issue
of the Court's refusal to give the requested instruction.
While the City does agree with the factual recitation
of the testimony, the City strongly disputes the ante- and
penultimate paragraphs of the "Statement of Facts" in the
Brief of Appellant dealing with the requested instruction.
(Brief of Appellant, p. 4.)

The entire colloquy between the

Court and counsel for defendant Nelson concerning the
requested instruction is set out below.
JUDGE: Thank you very much, we appreciate
your service and your now free to go, thank
you. Mr. Mack would you wish sentencing at
this time or would you wish sentencing at a
later date.
DM: Well, now is fine your Honor, I also
have an objection I'd like to put on about
the instructions.
JUDGE:

Yes, muhuh (yes).

DM: Okay, I asked the court to include an
instruction that would use as a defense the
fact that if the jury found that Mr. Nelson
was engaged in potential mutual combat or
altercation that that be a basis for
acquittal. I think that there was some
evidence to support that theory. The

evidence stated by the officer of that the
two were arguing with each other and in his
estimation that they had been involved
together in this. Or ask, I guess it would
depend on the definati n of altercation which
is not clear but it's my understanding of the
law that if there's any evidence to support
the defendants theory of the case that the
defendant is entitled to put an instruction
supporting that theory and I think that there
was some evidence.
(Transcript, p. 148-9.

Errors uncorrected.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

Defendant Nelson's proposed instruction dealing

with "mutual combat" or "consensual altercation" is totally
inapplicable to the facts of the present case.

The

requested instruction, admittedly drawn from Section 76-5104, U.C.A., is irrelevant to a battery charge under the
Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City.

Even if the

instruction somehow stated relevant law defendant Nelson
failed to preserve his objection as required by Rule 19,
U.R.Crim.P.

No record of the instruction, or objection to

its not being given, exists prior to the jury verdict of
guilty.

Further, given the entirety of the remaining

circumstances the Court's failure to give the irrelevant
unsupported instruction is not manifest error allowing this
Court to review absent proper preservation.
2.

The Court did not err in refusing the give the

requested "mutual combat" instruction as there was no
evidence to support the instruction.

Refusal to give an

instruction is only reversible if the defendant shows that

substantial evidence was presented in support of the refused
instruction sufficient to raise in the minds of the jurors a
reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt.

The best

evidence in support of the defendant's instruction is
presumably summarized in defendant's Brief which indicates
no such mutual consent to a savage beating.

Further, the

incompetent phraseology of the requested instruction would
have required the jury to find the mutual altercation beyond
reasonable doubt to exculpate the defendant.

Given the

facts of the case such a finding would have been impossible,
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT NELSON IS NOT ENTITLED TO
RAISE THE COURT'S REFUSAL TO GIVE THE
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION WHICH WAS
IRRELEVANT AND NOT PROPERLY PRESERVED.
Defendant Nelson admits in his Brief

ff

[t]he language of

the [requested] instruction is taken from Utah Code Ann,
§76-5-104 . . . ."

(Brief of Appellant, p. 6.)

Defendant's

counsel makes a Procrustean leap of logic arguing that since
the cited statute only precludes the consensual altercation
defense in the event of homicide of assault charges
concomitant with the use of a deadly weapon that therefore,
ipso facto, such a defense is always otherwise available.
Notwithstanding the absolute factual non-support for the
requested instruction (discussed in Point II below) the
instruction is wholly irrelevant to this case.

Section 76-5-104, by its own terms, deals with
prosecutions under the Utah Criminal Code.

The prosecution

in the instant case was for violation of the Revised
Ordinances of Salt Lake City for battery.

As such, the

consensual altercation provisions of the Utah Code are
irrelevant.
Further, it has been generally held that "mutual
combat" provisions do not mean merely fights or scuffles.
"Mutual combat" generally involves deadly weapons in a fight
on serious terms usually ending in murder or manslaughter.
Donaldson v. State, 249 Ga. 186, 289 S.E.2d 242, 244 (1982);
People v. Neal, 112 lll.App.3d 964, 446 N.E.2d 270, 274
(1983).
Given the deadly serious nature of the intended "mutual
combat" contemplated by a "mutual combat" statute it is
plain that the intent of the Legislature in passing Section
76-5-104 was to preclude the defense.

The purpose what not,

as contemplated by the twisted logic of defendant Nelson, to
allow a disfavored defense in case of a fight less serious
than a "duel".
Even if the instruction was somehow relevant law,
defendant Nelson failed to properly preserve his objection.
Defendant Nelson's Brief nowhere cites any objection to the
Court's refusal to give the requested instruction which, as
would have been required, occurred before the jury was
instructed.

The only record of any objection is contained

in the transcript cited above in the Statement of Facts.
This clearly shows the objection occurred after the jury
verdict was reached.
Whether or not defendant Nelson's counsel in fact
properly objected to the Court's refusal to give the
instructions "stating distinctly the matter to which he
objects and the grounds of his objection" is simply not in
the record before this Court.

(Rule 19, U.R.Crim.P.)

It is

the duty of defendant's counsel to property preserve the
record for his appeal to this Court.

Snyderville

Transportation Co., Inc. v. Christiansen, 609 P.2d 939 (Utah
1980); Morgan v. Pistone, 25 Utah 2d 63, 475 P.2d 839
(1970).

This appeal is based on legal rulings, not on any

Fourth Amendment denial of effective representation.

As

such, the Court cannot review what it does not have before
it.
Finally, given the clear irrelevance of the
instruction, the failure of preservation and the factual
weaknesses which will be described below, the Court's
refusal to give the requested instruction is not "manifest
error" allowing this Court to review absent proper
preservation.

"Manifest error" was best discussed in the

murder case of State v. Cobo, 90 Utah 89, 60 P.2d 952
(1936).

In that case, the trial judge made an actual error

in the instruction and used the words "murder in the first
degree" when he intended to use the words "voluntary

manslaughter."

Cobo, supra at 959.

Without defining

"manifest error" the Supreme Court ruled that such an
inadvertent mistake in the charge was clearly a manifest
error allowing review even without proper preservation.
Cobo remains good law, unfortunately without significant
further elucidation as to the meaning of "manifest error."
See, State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591 (Utah 1988); State v.
Kazda, 545 P.2d 190 (Utah 1976).
Given the irrelevance of the proposed instruction and
its lack of preservation this Court should dismiss the
appeal solely on procedural grounds.

If, however, the Court

chooses to review the substance of the evidence allegedly
supporting the requested instruction the propriety of the
trial court's ruling will only become clearer.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO GIVE THE
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION WAS NOT ERROR
BECAUSE THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO EVIDENCE
SUPPORTING THE INSTRUCTION.
Throughout his Brief defendant Nelson appears to argue
that if he has adduced at trial a mere scintilla of
tangentially connected evidence he is therefore entitled to
have the jury instructed with any badly written, irrelevant
and unsupported instruction he so chooses.

In that

contention defendant Nelson is not supported by the law nor
by the facts.

The standard for determining whether or not a refusal
to give an instruction is reversible error is, by now, so
well known as to be the subject of mere Per Curiam opinions.
The standard requires four elements:
1.

A burden on the defendant;

2.

To show substantial evidence;

3.

Supporting the refused instructions;

4.

Sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt in the

minds of the jurors as to the defendant's guilt.
State v. McKenna, 728 P.2d 984, 985 (Utah 1986); State v.
Noren, 704 P.2d 568, 571 (Utah 1985).

The converse of that

standard is also good law:
If the evidence is so slight as to be
incapable of raising any reasonable doubt in
the jury's mind as to whether defendant acted
[as requested in the proposed instruction]
then the tendered instruction was properly
refused.
McKenna, supra at 985.

State v. Castillo, 23 Utah 2d 70,

457 P.2d 618 (1969); State v. Harding, 635 P.2d 33, 34 (Utah
1981).
Applying the standards above there is simply no
question of the weight of the evidence supporting defendant
Nelson's requested instruction.

Not only is there no

"substantial evidence", there is simply no evidence.
The requested instruction would have required the jury
to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant Nelson and
Melissa Fonnesbeck were both parties to either a "duel,

mutual combat, or other consensual altercation."
Appellant, Addendum B.)

(Brief of

Not even defendant Nelson contends

that Ms. Fonnesbeck and he engaged in a "duel".

Therefore

the instruction is only factually supported if there is
substantial evidence of either "mutual combat" or
"consensual altercation".
As noted above "mutual combat" is generally defined to
be more than a mere fight or scuffle usually, instead,
involving deadly weapons and mutual intention of using them.
Another possible definition of "mutual combat" is raised in
6 Am.Jur.2d, Assault and Battery §69, "where two persons
engaged in a fight by mutual agreement for the purpose of
testing who was the best man . . . ."

The City was unable

in its research to find a case defining "consensual
altercation".

However, under the statutory principles of

construction known as noscitur a sociss and ejusdem generis
the undefined phrase "consensual altercation" should be read
as merely another way of describing an event similar to a
"duel" or "mutual combat."
Given the words and their meaning in the proposed
instruction the next step in the analysis must be to apply
the facts of the case to determine whether they support the
proposed instruction.

The best factual support for the

proposed instruction would, presumably, be found in
defendant's Brief.

That evidence is summarized in two

paragraphs on page 2 of the Brief.

Essentially, after

defendant Nelson chased another man away from Ms.
Fonnesbeckfs apartment Ms. Fonnesbeck began yelling at him
"while standing in the rain clad only in a robe (T. 122)."
As a result of that terrible provocation of being yelled at
by somebody in a robe in the rain defendant Nelson picked
Ms. Fonnesbeck up over his shoulder like a sack of potatoes
about to be mashed and carried her inside over her
struggling, kicking and hitting protests.
While the argument continued (unsurprisingly) inside
the house defendant Nelson broke Ms. Fonnesbeck?s nose with
his hand.

That, in its entirety, is defendant Nelson's best

evidence.

(Brief of Appellant, p. 2.)

From the evidence it is unclear what defendant Nelson
contends supports the "mutuality" or "consensuality" of the
altercation.
rain?

What was it?

Was it standing outside in the

Was it standing outside in the rain in a robe?

Was

it struggling, kicking and screaming while being manhandled
like a sack of potatoes?
inside?

Was it continuing the argument

To argue, as defendant Nelson does, that any of the

conduct of Ms. Fonnesbeck constitutes evidence of a "duel,
mutual combat, or other consensual altercation" is as
absurd, heartless and insupportable as can be imagined.
Many analogies come to mind but the Court can surely fill in

its own.
Finally, even if there were some evidence supporting
the "mutual combat" instruction the inept and incompetent
phraseology of the instruction would render the trial
court's refusal to give it harmless.

As written by

defendant's counsel, the instruction would have required the
jury to find the "duel, mutual combat, or other consensual
altercation" beyond a reasonable doubt.

The City has no

idea where the "reasonable doubt" standard came from in the
proposed instruction.

(The error of this phraseology, and a

lack of any record discussion of it, further buttresses the
City's argument that this appeal should be dismissed on the
procedural grounds raised in Point I above.)
Even in the event of a properly requested "selfdefense" instruction the burden is not on the defendant to
establish "self-defense" beyond a reasonable doubt.

In

fact, the defendant's burden may fall "far short of
establishing the justification or excuse by a preponderance
of the evidence upon the subject."

State v. Noel, 712 P.2d

To claim, as defendant Nelson does, that his testimony is
supported by the Salt Lake City police officer's description
of a "typical family fight" is ludicrous. (Brief of
Appellant, p. 3-4.) The mere fact that two parties are
engaged in familial warfare does not mean that both parties
are "consenting" to be beaten. Defendant Nelson's insulting
argument, carried to its logical extremes, would vitiate any
spousal, or for that matter, child abuse cases. People
almost always swing back when being beaten if only to
protect themselves.

211, 214 (Utah 1985), quoting State v. Vacos, 40 Utah 169,
181, 120 P. 497, 502 (1911).2
Given the ridiculously high standard of proof which the
requested instruction would have imposed on the defendant
and the minuscule factual support for the defense any error
by the Court was totally harmless.

Even with the

instruction as written, the jury could not possibly have
found any verdict other than guilty.
CONCLUSION
Defendant Nelson's proposed instruction was legally
irrelevant, factually unsupported, factually unsupportable,
improperly preserved, ineptly written and, in any case,
thoroughly harmless.

As such, the Court should dismiss this

appeal and sustain the jury's verdict if guilty.
DATED this 10th day of January, 1989.

BRUCE R. BAIRD
Assistant City Attorney
Attorney for Respondent

Again, the City feels constrained to point out that this
appeal is based on legal issues rather than any Fourth
Amendment denial.
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LEGAL DEFENDERS ASSOCIATION, 42 East 500 South, #300, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84111, by depositing the same in the U.S.
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